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ABSTRACT 
Experimentations and innovations that involve barge transport flourish in France as the main leg for 
urban distribution of goods. Based on astudy of existing container barge transport (CBT) chains, this 
articleidentifies several obstacles impeding their use for urban river logistics: the complexity of these 
chains, on the one hand, and the level of specificity of assets involved in the loading and unloading 
phases, on the other hand. With the help of transaction costs economics, the articleshows that 
several innovations involving barge transport to supply French cities share a common aim to diminish 
transaction costs, especially in those phases. Thisarticlealso shows that coordination and pooling 
issues lead to adopt integrated or quasi-integrated governance structures to organize regular inland 
shipping lines necessary to supply dense French urban areas. 
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 Nowadays urban freight transport is becoming a more and more complex matter. Mainly 
achieved through road haulage, urban freight transport suffers from increasing traffic jams that raise 
significantly its private and social costs (Henscher&Pucket, 2005). Public authorities and private 
 2 
companies are looking for alternate solutions (Debah, 2010). In France, stakeholders are turning to 
inland river transport becausethis underused mode of transport can easily reach the heart of French 
main cities with less CO2emissions (Raynard, 2012; TL&Associés, 2006). River transport is indeed a 
mass-scale mode of transport thatachieves economies of scale and reduces negative externalities. 
Many experimentations and innovations involvingriver transport - mainly container barge transport 
(CBT) – are spreading for supplying urban dense areas (EICB/BVB, 2009; Gort, 2009;Kreutzberger, 
2003;Nemoto et al., 2006; Van Hassel &Vanelslander, 2011; Wiegmans, 2005; Wiegmans&Konings, 
2007), such as those done in France for shippers Auchan, Point P, or Franprix. The asset of 
penetrating the heart of major French cities on noncongested roads is undeniable on paper. It 
remains to be seen how this asset can effectively meet the expectations of all stakeholders and, in 
particular, how to combine the advantages of a mass-scale mode of transport with the growing 
importance of lean management and just-in-time in supply chain management (Guilbault, 2008). 
Many obstacles remain impeding the development of this kind of solution in urban areas. Urban 
density, particularly in Paris and the Ile-de-France, and high land value impose strong constraints on 
spaces dedicated to logistics (Dablanc, 2011). Additionally, transaction costs are supported by agents 
willing to use river transport (Brooks et al., 2012). Indeed, the complexity of barging logistics raises 
coordination issues and transaction costs (Fischman &Lendjel, 2012) that affect the decision-making 
process of both shippers and carriers. 
 
 In continuation of previous works (De Langenet al., 2006; Fischman & Lendjel, 2011;Franc & 
Van der Horst, 2010;Panayides, 2002;Van der Horst &De Langen, 2008), a neo-institutional approach 
(Williamson, 1996) of river transport was chosen to understand how these issues are dealt with. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a powerful theoretical apparatus to tackle coordination 
problems andexplain actual governance structures (market, hybrid, hierarchy) and strategies of firms 
to control transaction chains. Few studies(Beyer &Debrie, 2013; Frémont, 2012; Paffoni, 2013; 
Raimbault, 2014)address theconditions of development of urban river logistics in France, despite the 
growing concern of environmental and congestion costs. Moreover, the neo-institutional approach is 
barely used in the literature to tackle urban logistics or urban freight transport. The most recent 
research on the topic (Gonzalez-Feliuet al., 2014; Macharis&Melo, 2011) doesn’t quote TCE when 
dealing with different kinds of governance structure used for logistics pooling (Moranaet al., 2014). 
Space is lacking here to develop a survey of the existing literature on urban logistics, but, 
significantly, the last one performed by Ducret and Rosset (2014) found no TCE approach inthis new 
field. Several significant exceptions are yet to be mentioned here (e.g.,Fabbe-Costes&Roussat, 2011; 
Roy et al., 2006). 
 
 Following Yvrande-Billon and Ménard (2005), this article aims toshow that lowering the level 
of specificity of the involved assets in river transport is a condition for successful innovation in urban 
logistics.Butbecause of the well-known difficulty incollecting empirical data to assess the amount of 
transaction costs and the transaction’s attributes (Ruester, 2010),1 this article is based only on 
interviews and case studies. Additionally, the articlestresses that coordination issues raised by urban 
                                                          
1
Such attempts have nonetheless been done in Fischman and Lendjel (2012), where ex ante costs have been 
estimated at roughly 8% of the total costs of a bargeman operating a barge type Freycinet of 350 tons. If ex 
post costs are added (mainly of demurrages), the total amount of transaction costs exceeds 10% of total costs. 
But this evaluation is not relevant here in CBT.  
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river logistics can be supported only by integrated or quasi-integrated governance structures, as 
observed for freight forwarders (Saeed, 2013).Thus, section 1 starts with the characteristics of the 
transaction of CBT, which is the existing way to supply goods through river transport. Indeed, 
goodsusually can’t be deliveredin bulk in urban areas (except for building materials). They must be 
packed for transport, whatever the way (cardboard, pallet, palletized in a container). The CBT is thus 
the way to carry goods by river boats and is as such the logical starting point of this study. Section 
2deals with observed governance structures of CBT chains in France. According to 
Williamson’sremediableness criterion, the observed governance structure of a given transaction is 
presumed efficient and aligned to its attributes. We point out thatthe monitoring and controlcosts 
explain the featuresof the observed structureson the Seine and Rhone rivers.Taking into account the 
existing attributes of the sub-transactions composing the CBT chains and their governance 
structures, the last section (Section 3) assesses recent innovations in urban river logistics and 
discusses their organizational and transactional conditions of success. 
Definition and Perimeter of the CBT Transaction Chain 
 A presentation of transaction costs economics in logistics can be found in Roy et al. (2006) 
and, of course, in Williamson (1996). Briefly, this theory considers that all transactions bearex ante 
transaction costs (searching and negotiating costs, contracting costs) and ex posttransaction costs 
(monitoring costs, adaptation costs, claims, etc.). Firms are framing their transactions in definite 
governance structures (“market,” i.e., outsourcing;“hierarchy,” i.e.,internalization;“hybrid,” i.e.,long-
term contracts) that are supposedly minimizing transaction costs (according to the 
“remediablenesscriterion”;Williamson, 1996,2010). These costs are determined by the transaction’s 
attributes (specificity, frequency, uncertainty). 
 
 According to Williamson,a transaction is a transfer of goods or services that“take[s] place at 
the interface between (rather than within) technologically separable stages” (Williamson, 2010, p. 
685). Here, the transaction at stake focuses on CBT,which is the transfer of a service of containerized 
transport by barge, so that a container can be moved from one point (a port, for instance) to another 
(e.g., a warehouse in urban area) during a given time.2The CBT transactional chain includes at least 
six sub-transactions (STs). 
 ST 1 is the transfer of organization and coordination of a container transport by the shipper 
to an economic unit (usually different from the shipper, corresponding to the missions of a 
freight forwarder, but can be performed by a shipping company).  
 ST 2 is the transfer of the rights to use a transport capacity between the transport organizer 
and the owner of barges (or of slots) or of containers. 
 ST 3 is the transfer of the CBT service going from quay to quay from the transport organizer 
to the CBT economic unit. This ST is itself likely to be split in two: the CBT itself and the barge 
propulsion by a pusher tug and a crew. 
 ST 4 is the transfer of  thecargo-loading service on barges between the transport organizer 
(often the shipping company) and the handling company at the departure quay. 
 ST 5 is the transfer of the cargo-unloading service from barges between the transport 
organizer (often the shipping company) and the arrival quay handling company. 
 ST 6 is the transfer of pre- and end-road haulage services between the transport organizer 
and road haulage operators. 
                                                          
2
A container isastandardizedintermodal unit load device (usually20 or 40feet long) designed to facilitate 
transfers of cargo between different modes of transport in the safest way. 
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The provisionof a containeris anST prior to the transaction of CBT. The 
containerrevolutionizedtheway we think abouttransportationbecause, somehow, goods are not 
moved anymore, but rather their container is, whether empty or full. Yet, even though it is essential, 
this ST remains peripheral becausethe container is a loading unit of maritime origin. CBT, therefore, 
can be considered to bea ST of the container transport’s transaction.If the masterlink in 
thetransaction chain ismaritime,inland waterway transportthenappears as aterrestrialextension of 
amaritimetransport.3Then, the freight forwarder or the shipping company usually hasthe commercial 
function to fill the containers, to position them at the customer's warehouse,or evento organize their 
stuffing-strippingin the case of grouping. 
 
Each of these STs includes many sub-STs or second-rank STs. ST4 or ST5 (loading-unloading 
containers, managing containers at quaysides) are in themselves complex sets of sub-STs, even more 
so now that the container revolution has taken place. Indeed, the terminal operator must be able to 
implement the vessel-loading plan sent by the shipping line operator. Thus, the formerhas to face 
several external constraints to comply with container-handling procedures with a precise order of 
loading-unloading containers and, therefore, with onshore container pre-arrangements (see Zhao 
&Goodchild, 2010). Operatorsalso face their own constraints (minimal number of container 
movements, optimization of available space, management of human and material resources, etc.) to 
comply with loading plans (Galbrun&Le Du, 2007). Though interdependent, the container loading-
unloading sub-ST is sometimes dissociated from the quay container handling sub-ST. As for the 
container inland navigation operation itself (ST3), it is likely split into the CBT operation and the 
barge propulsion by a pusher tug, the latter being sometimes divided in two parts: the availability of 
a crew and the provisions of a pusher tug. Other sub-STs may occur when local pushers (or 
harborpusher tugs) move barges in a port, whereas power pusher tugs make convoys of lashed 
barges for long hauls between ports. Thus, although it appears to be simple, the CBT transaction is 
actually quite complex. 
  
According to awell-known mechanism, expanding demand by container standardization leads to the 
segmentation of the barge transport transaction into an increasing number of STs. Nevertheless, the 
actual number of governance structures framing these STs is surprisingly reduced compared to what 
is theoretically possible.  
Governance Structures of French CBT Chains 
 
A specific extraction from the ECHO4 national survey database (realized by the INRETS in 2004) shows 
that 100% of the 23 CBT shipments found in the survey (from a total of 10,462 shipments involved in 
the survey) are outsourced and involved at least three operators. In other transport chains, only 7% 
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 Note that it could be part of the transaction’s perimeter when CBT becomes independent of the maritime 
chain as it is on the Rhine (Zurbach, 2005). 
4
 ECHO (Envois - CHargeurs- Opérateurs de transport) is a national survey designed to understand shippers’ 
practices and whose measurement unit is the shipment sent by a shipper (Guilbault, 2008).  
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of the shipments – parcels excluded – require at least three operators (Guilbault, 2008, p. 108; 
Bréhier et al., 2009, p. 8). Hence, the CBT is usually more complex to organize than the other (often 
smaller) transport chains. How can weexplain thiscomplexity? Could it impede the development of 
urban river logistics? TCE is the appropriate tool to deal with these questions.  
 
As Williamson stated,“the critical dimensions for describing alternative modes of governance (…) are 
incentive intensity (…), administrative command and control (…), and contract law regime 
(…)”(Williamson, 2010, p. 681).Following this typology, structures governing STs in French CBTs have 
to be assessed. 
 
The first point to consider is the theoretical number of combinations of governance structures 
permitted by the transactional chain of the river transport of containers. Considering that each of the 
six STs (if the river interconnection service is excludedas public service) may be achieved by at least 
three governance structures (spot market, hybrid or long-term contract, hierarchy), the decision tree 
includes a set of 729 possible combinations (36 = 729) of governance structures for this transactional 
chain (Williamson, 2010). The longer the chain, the bigger the set of possible combinations.5 This 
exponential character of the economic complexity of the chain contrasts sharply with the very 
limited number of combinations (six) observed in the river transport of containers in France. If an 
inventory of these chains has already been done (Frémont et al., 2009; IAU, 2008; VNF, 2009; 
Zurbach, 2005), their typology and their understanding usingthe insights of transactional analysis still 
has to be done for the French basins. 
 
Among the six regular services observed on the Seine River between Le Havre and Paris 
(Marfret/Fluviofeeder, Logiseine-Logiyonne, Maersk, MSC, RSC/Greenmodal, SNTC Carline) and the 
two (Logirhône, RSC/Greenmodal) existing in the Rhône-Saône river basin, four services are really 
provided by barge operators, Maersk and MSC contracting with Logiseine to chart Logiseine’s barges 
(VNF, 2009).6 The governance structures of CBT operators on the Seine and the Rhône are all 
integrated or quasi-integrated, without any arm’s length transactions, as shown in Table 1. Among 
the 48 STs of these eightservices, 63% have a hybrid governance structure and 21% are fully 
integrated (hierarchy). Even when a barge operator has no specific agreement with a handling 
operator, thecontract is usually settled on an annual basis even if it is proportional to the volume of 
containers handled. Hybrid modalities predominate when complete integration of the considered ST 
is not possible (lack of funds) or not wanted (for incentive reasons).Following Williamson (1996), the 
governance structure of a transaction is presumed aligned on its attributes, namely, asset specificity 
(i.e., level of loss associated to alternate use of assets involved in the transaction or 
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Letnbe the number of elements in the subset of governance structures and p the number of transactions at 
stake;n
p
 is the total number of available combinations. Thus, if all the governance structures are taken into 
account (franchise, joint-venture, quasi-integration, long-term agreements, etc.), the number of possibilities 
increases more quickly. 
6
Other CBT operators may operate but not on a regular basis. They are chartered by a regular operator and 
operate as sub-contractors.  
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redeployability’slevel of the asset), frequency (number of times a transaction occurs in a given 
period), and uncertainty (related to the environment of the transaction and to the behavior of 
parties in condition of bilateral dependency). In terms of CBTs STs, asset specificity, and frequency 
are mostly determinant.  
Table 1: Governance Structures (M-Market, X-Hybrid, H-Hierarchy) of CBT 
Sub-
Transacti
ons 
Synthes
is 
ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5 ST6 
Label Synthesis 
of GS for 
the 
transaction 
chain  
Transfer of the 
container 
transport 
organization 
between a 
shipper and a 
forwarder  
Transfer 
of rights 
to use a 
transport 
capacity 
between 
the 
transport 
organizer 
and the 
owner of 
the 
capacity 
Transfer of 
the quay-
to-quay 
transport 
operation 
between 
the 
transport 
organizer 
and the 
barge 
operator 
Transfer of 
the 
maritime 
port 
handling 
from the 
transport 
organizer 
to the 
handling 
company 
at the 
departure 
quay 
Transfer of 
inland port 
handling from 
the transport 
organizer to 
the handling 
company at 
the arrival 
quay  
Transfer of the pre- and 
end-road haulage 
between the transport 
organizer and the road 
haulage operator 
SEINE BASIN 
Fluviofe
eder 
XHHMMX X (Marfret’s 
subsidiary; long-
term contract 
with MSC) or M 
H H  M M X 
Logisein
e/Logiyo
nne 
MHXXXX M H (Barges 
of 
Logiseine) 
X 
(Logiseine 
is a joint 
venture 
held by 
CFT and 
TN) 
X 
(Logiseine 
is a joint 
venture 
held by 
CFT and 
TN) 
X (CFT and TN 
shareholders of 
PTSA) 
X 
Maersk XXXXXX X (Long-term 
agreement with 
CFT) 
X (charter 
capacity 
to CFT) 
X 
(Logiseine 
is partially 
held by 
CFT) 
X 
(Logiseine 
is a joint 
venture 
held by 
CFT and 
TN) 
X (CFT and TN 
shareholders of 
PTSA) 
X 
MSC XXXXXX X (Long-term 
agreement with 
CFT) 
X 
(Charter 
capacity 
to CFT) 
X 
(Logiseine 
partially 
held by 
CFT) 
X (TN MSC 
is a joint 
venture 
with TN) 
X (CFT and TN 
shareholders of 
PTSA) 
X 
RSC/Gre
enmodal 
XHHXMX X (CMA-CGM’s 
subsidiary) or M 
H H X (GMP is a 
joint 
venture 
held by 
CMA-CGM 
and DPW) 
M X (LTI is part of 
Greenmodal) 
SNTC-
Carline 
XXXMHX  X (Alliance with 
Soufflet) or M 
X 
(Alliance 
with 
SCAT) 
X (Alliance 
with SCAT) 
M H (SNTC owns 
handling of 
Nogent/Marne) 
X (Alliance with STTI) 
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RHONE-SAONE BASIN 
Logirhôn
e 
MHHMXX M H (CFT’s 
Barges) 
H (CFT’s 
subsidiary) 
M X (CFT is a 
shareholder of 
Lyon Terminal) 
X 
RSC/Gre
enmodal 
XHHXMX X (CMA-CGM’s 
subsidiary) or M 
H H X (Eurofos 
is a joint 
venture 
held by 
CMA-CGM 
and DPW) 
M X (LTI is part of 
Greenmodal) 
 
In ST1, CFT subsidiaries (Logiseine/Logiyonne/Logirhône)are the only ones to perform the 
organization of the CBT with a market governance structure. The others intervene mostly in broader 
maritime chains within hybrid governance structures.Mostly, this ST is part of door-to-door services 
supplied by container shipping lines and, as such, needs to be controlled through hybrid - at least - 
governance structures by their parent companies. The specificity of this kind of transport chain 
requires an expertise (human-asset specificity)in freight forwarding and dedicated organizational 
routines between the shipping line and the CBT line. But the main asset is the brand, the reputation 
asset necessary to drain customers in this highly competitive market. With behavioral uncertainty, 
this specificity explains the governance structures framing the ST1. 
 
The transfer of rights to use a capacity (ST2) is supported logically by hybrid (5 over 8) and hierarchic 
(3 over 8) governance structures because of the regularity and frequency of the ST at stake 
(Notteboom, 2006). But sometimes, during peak seasons, additional capacity can be chartered 
through short-term contracts. Assets in large-gauge basins have an average payload of 200 
containers (TEU) on the Seine (EICB/BVB, 2009, p. 51). Because of the lack of large-gauge 
interconnections between the main French inland waterway basins (Rhine, Rhône, Seine), barges on 
them have a high specificity. Their transfer to different basins requires a maritime move with a 
tugboat, implying high redeployment costs. From this point of view, barges and pushers have a lower 
specificity becausethey can be separated and connected quite as easily even if they work together 
and can be used for other transports than containers.  
 
In ST3,long-term contracts (50%) and hierarchies (50%) are the appropriate governance structures to 
provide a regular service because of the frequency and the regularity of the ST at stake. 
Niérat(2014)shows that aself-propelledrivercontainer shiponthe Rhônebasinmakes about66tripsa 
year,with a rate ofloaded trip of 99% anda fill rate expressedin TEUsof 72%. With four shuttles per 
week between Le Havre and Gennevilliers (IAU, 2008; VNF, 2009), Logiseine cannot rely on spot 
transactions to purchase every week the human and physical assets (with more or less high degrees 
of specificity) needed, except during peak activity to increase its capacity. It is the same for all the 
other operators because of the networked nature of this activity.Barge operators, whether employee 
or not, accumulate knowledge - often informal - and skills about theirboats, the river basin, and the 
practices of loading andunloading in different ports (Fischman &Lendjel, 2011). If theydo not own the 
boat, theynonetheless accumulate experience and expertise on specific equipment (pushers and 
barges) theywill not find elsewhere in another French company. Integration or quasi-integration of 
specific human and physical assets is needed for this ST. But, in order to have a higherincentive 
device than hierarchy, the CFT sometimes uses a singular hybrid structure (SociétéEn Participation 
 8 
[SEP]) for some of its pushers.7 The SEP pools resources from each partner. CFT rents the physical 
asset (the pusher tug) and a small dedicated company (SARL) rents human resources (two crews of 
six people to secure a 24/24 driving each week). The SEP sells a pushing service per hour or kilometer 
(with a yearly contract) to CFT. Logiseinecommercializes the capacity of transport on its barges and 
asks CFT to make the transport service. Thus, CFT subcontracts the pushing service to the SEP. The 
SEP assumes earnings and operating expenses of the pusher tug so that each partner is directly 
involved in its operating income. Particularly, the structure incites the crew to take care of the 
equipment (a pusher tug is very expensive, which explains why CFT needs to be part of the SEP), its 
fuel consumption (main variable cost), and the service liability and punctuality. This hybrid 
governance structure (i.e.,quasi-integration) is often used in road haulage (Fernandez et al., 1998) 
but relatively uncommon in river transport, even within CFT. Bycontrast, other more usual hybrid 
structures (regular sub-contracting, long-term charter, barge transport pool, etc.) can be seen on the 
Rhine (Zurbach, 2005).  
 
Regarding ST4, hybrid governance structures (5 over 8) dominate market governance structures (3 
over 8) in maritime ports even though the latter are highly sitespecific for inland navigation agents 
(Franc &Van der Horst, 2010). Inland quays mustbe located in the vicinity of maritime quays – where 
containers are stacked - in order to minimize space and time costs necessary to move containers 
from a ship to a barge.But using maritime quays is costly for barge transport operators (oversized 
equipment, random availability of the quay, etc.) (Fischer et al., 2003, p. 27) and advantageous for 
the terminal operators (higher rate of handling capacity use).Barge operators are faced with the 
trade-offs between extra costs of maritime handling (but at the vicinity of inland quays) and 
additional costs of a dedicated handling quay with the related transfer of containers from inland to 
the maritime quays.That’s the reason why long-term contracts dominate here.This logic also prevails 
for the vicinity between warehouse and inland quays. The location of an inland quay in a logistics 
cluster area strengthens its site specificity becauseof the need to dedicate space for loading and 
unloading containers. Second-rank STs are here also logically integrated or quasi-integrated. 
 
ST5 offers a diversity of governance structures (threemarkets, fourhybrids, onehierarchy). Most 
often, barge operators are shareholders of inland terminal operators. Carrying containers entails 
dedicated assets from barge and terminal operators to reach high levels of productivity. Terminal 
operators need to dedicate specific cranes and engines (docks, gantry cranes, stacking straddle 
carrier, stacking space, etc.) to perform container handling for barges. Barge operators need specific 
barges designed to carry containers and dedicated terminals to load and unload them. This mutual 
dependency generates risks of underinvestment and opportunism (Joskow, 1987; Klein, 1988). This 
concern is particularly high during the launching phase of a new service, as was the case on the Seine 
in 1994. A barge transport operator (Logiseine) and two terminal operators in Le Havre and in 
Gennevilliers (near Paris) had to generate simultaneously large investments to start a regular line. 
Contrary to maritime container terminals that couldeasily allocate part of their resources to 
container bargeswhen they dock (when free of the container ship to be loaded or unloaded) 
(Steenken et al., 2004), inland container terminals need dedicated assets. The large amount of 
required capital and its negative profitability in the short term explains why public port authorities 
are often involved during the launching phase of a CBT line. For instance, Paris Terminal SA, the 
inland public port operator, was a shareholder of Logiseine barge operator at its very beginning. 
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Interview with S.Fortrye, CFT’s Directorof Public Relation (November 11, 2010). 
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Additionally, the location of quays in the vicinity of a dense urban area creates a strong site 
specificity for inland terminal operators in this ST. Based on Joskow (1987) and Klein (1988) we know 
that vertical integration is likely to occur when dedicated assets are involved in the transaction in 
order to avoid hold-up risks associated withthe quasi-rent at stake in dedicated investments. The 
exceptionally long duration of contracts (from 15 to 30 years depending on the terminal) of land 
concession (quasi-integration of site) is an indicator of the high level of site specificity and of the 
quasi-rent it generates (Monteverde&Teece,1982).In STs of second rank of handling service (ST4 and 
ST5), the integration of human assets (dockers first, then crane drivers) has been done andthe 
market governance structure (via the dockers’ intermittence system) prevailed before the reforms 
indocker status in 1992 and 2008.8 They aim to integrate dockers intostevedoring companies and 
thus to promote hierarchical coordination of their activities (Galbrun&Le Du, 2007). The container 
revolution increased the specificity of stevedores’ human capital. The stevedoring industry has 
changed because of the increasing technicality and capitalistic intensity necessary to handle 
containers. Hence, dock workers and crane drivers have acquired a more specific technical 
knowledge and a higher degree of specificity. Asset specificity prevails also for container-handling 
equipment (especially gantry cranes and, toa lesser extent, reach stackers). Hierarchy seems to be 
the best governance structure here given the actual attributes of this ST.  
 
One hundred percent of ST6’s governance structures are hybridsbecauselong-term contracts are 
necessary to convince road carriers to invest in skeleton trailers configured to carry containers. 
Bruno Kauffmann9stressed that the “difficultyinstarting the activitywas that road carriers would 
notbuyskeletontrailers;sowe had to findowner-operators whowere willing toinvest, hence our 
commitment to theseowner-operators.” Relationships withthese carriersarestructured by framework 
contracts, generally on an annual basis (Eccles, 1981), butaccompanied byspotcontracts with"big-
doers"in case ofpeak activity. 
 
It is thus clear that, among the three dimensions described by Williamson (incentive intensity, 
administrative command and control, contract law regime), control strongly dominates the CBT 
chain. If the number of services can be explained by the amount of investments necessary to get 
network economies at the current level of demand, the small number of types of chainof governance 
structure observed here can be explained by the attributes of the STs composing that transaction 
chain. High frequency and regularity of transactions and the quite high degree of asset specificity 
may also explain whyonly four barge operators can be found in CBT on the Seine and Rhône rivers. 
 
Hence, as shown, the CBT transaction chain governance structure is integrated or quasi-integrated, 
which demonstrates that transaction costs are sufficiently high to prevent market governance 
structure, in compliance with Williamson’s remediableness criterion.The domination of hybrid 
governance structures (68%) confirms the complexity of CBT chains identified in the ECHO 
survey.Such a complexity generates highex antetransaction costs for shippers willing to use CBT for 
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 Law no. 92-496 of June 9, 1992, changed the working arrangements in maritime ports and law no. 2008-660 
of July 4, 2008,related to port reform. 
9
Interview of Bruno Kauffmann, CFT’s commercial director (June 6, 2012). 
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theirurban supply chain. Freight forwarders handle precisely this complexity and help to lower ex 
ante transaction costs, but up to a limited extent. In particular, ST5,with its high level of site 
specificity, and ST6, with the difficulty of convincingroad operators to invest in dedicated 
assets,seem to impede the use of urban river logistics. 
Discussion: Which Governance Structuresare suitable for Urban River Logistics? 
 
Lowering the level of asset specificity can be considered here to bea way to lower CBT transaction 
and production costs. Given thegovernance structurescurrentlygoverning CBT transactions and 
theirSTs, and given their attributes, which trends could we then expect for the development of urban 
river logistics? Recent innovations are first assessed here in that respect before tackling the new 
concept of Distri-Seine put forward by CFT. 
Production and Transaction Costs in Recent Innovations in Urban River Logistics 
Two experiments to supply supermarkets are regularly citedas examplesof sustainableurban logistics 
inthe Paris area: Monoprix’s supply (achieved by its subsidiary Samada) that accessesby rail the 
HalleGabrielLaméofParisBercy,on the one hand (Delaître&De Barbeyrac, 2012),and more recently, on 
theother hand, Franprix(Casino Group subsidiary),whichrelies ontheriverport ofla Bourdonnais in 
Paris (Greenport, 2013). This last experiment started in September2012 aftertwoyears of study 
andone yearcommercialengineering.Operated in partnershipwithNorbertDentressangle (for road 
haulage) andSCAT (the barge operator), the servicecarries each day 26containersby barge from the 
river portofBonneuil-sur-Marne (94) to the quayof La Bourdonnaisin the 7th arrondissementofParis. 
Then, the containers are deliveredby truckto80 westbound storeswithin a radiusof4 km. The delivery 
of parcels by Vert-Chez-Vous, a courier using green modes of transport on the model of DHL in 
Amsterdam, is another example. Pickups and parcel deliveries in Paris are achieved with several 
electric tricycles thatmeet a barge at different points of loading and unloading docks along the Seine 
banks of Paris on a given schedule. 
 Those last innovations in urban river transport help to identify the possible economic and 
organizational conditions of barging logistics in urban areas. Regarding production costs, several 
criteria can be stressed: 
1. Barging is a mass-scale mode, and the volume of demand must reach the break-even point 
on a regular basis, taking into account that it depends on many parameters (Beelen, 2011). 
For Franprix this minimal volume appears to be 26 containers per day, with a loading rate of 
54% (total capacity is 48 containers). The threshold effect based on fixed costs and 
transshipment costs is high in river transport and could be met either with a big doer – such 
as Franprix – or by pooling several deliveries by different shippers,such as for Vert-chez-
vous.Pooling helps to diminish average costs but necessarily generates transaction costs. If 
ex ante transaction costs are necessarily high when dealing with a big doer, they need to be 
considerably lower if pooling is expected.  
2. Last kilometers have to be performed by road. Thus, barge and truck rotations have to be 
synchronized. A sufficient number of trucks are scheduled to make deliveries of containers 
from the barge,which serves as a floating warehouse.Important organizational routines are 
thus necessary for a smooth urban river logistics and, thus, integrated or quasi-integrated 
governance structures.  
3. Road transportis the most expensive, so kilometers traveled by road should be minimized to 
maximize those of the waterway, following Palander’slaw of refraction (Aydalot, 1985, p. 24). 
Docking cost apart, this logic leads to multiplyingthe number of calls of the barge to minimize 
ton-kilometers performed by trucks (or by bikes, as designed by Vert-Chez-Vous). But the 
importance of fixed costs in handling and the scarcity of river docks connected to the road 
are not compatible with the multiplication of these river access points. A solution developed 
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by SteunpuntGoederenstromen (Gort, 2009) is to internalize the ST of handling (ST4 and ST5) 
by a side-loader gantry crane installed on the barge, which loads and unloads containers 
sideways. This solution has the advantage of reducing river ports’ high degree of 
sitespecificityfor logisticians. 
4. The scarcity of available space on urban riverbanks involves a zero storage time of containers 
(or only reduced time loading and unloading). The storage can then be done on a barge or in 
a warehouse on a suburb river dock where land constraint is lower. When flows are regular 
but have unpredictable content and temporal specificity, as in the case of Franprix, a 
warehouse on the outskirts of the town reduces the access time to the city center. In that 
case, Ports of Paris (at Gennevilliers)and Edouard Herriot (at Lyon) are well positioned, also 
because of their connections to maritime ports. When flows are regular with predictable 
content, the location of the warehouse in a seaport connected to the river system reduces 
the number of transshipments (see Radicatel, for example, which offers a logistics area 
dedicated to the river close to the port of Le Havre). 
5. Finally, the total cost of the entire river logistics chain must be less than the cost of 
alternative schemes. If Franprix's supply chain costs by barge proves higher than that of a 
road scheme, as notesStéphaneBonneton(driver of this innovation at Norbert 
Dentressangle),10 it is not the case if we include marginal social costs. According to the 
calculations put forward by the company, this solution would remove 374 trucks from 
Parisian roads. The forthcoming probable introduction of congestion-charging systems in 
major French cities should logically make a river-road scheme less expensive than any road 
scheme. 
 
On a transactional level, the examples clearly revealat least three obstacles impeding river supply of 
cities: 
1. Engineering costs of the scheme, which can be subsumed under the category of ex ante 
transaction costs, are important. Urban logistics by barge indeed require a tight coordination 
of the actors, hence,long contracts with one (or several) barge operators, one (or several) 
road operators, one (or several) port operators, one (or several) terminal operators, and one 
(or several) storage operators. Costs of organization and coordination are logically high 
enough, especially with the frequency of STs involving assetand sitespecificity, to justify the 
quasi-integration of the chain. In the case of Franprix, it took three years to initiate such a 
scheme (incidentally made feasible by subventions and significant investments supported by 
the port authority). Its importance is relative, however, with regard to the innovative 
character of the transaction. Indeed, any innovation can’t but generate many ex ante 
transaction costs. And, similar to any other cost, the unit transaction cost falls as the 
transaction volume increases. Spreading this innovation should drop significantly ex 
antetransaction costsof urban river logistics in the future. As StéphaneBonnetonstressed it, 
"many cities have contacted us for a similar service." Incidentally, this project has increased 
thebrand-name capital of the company. But except for some shippers in the retail sector,only 
few shippers have sufficient volumes to adopt such river logistics. The threshold necessary to 
get economies of scale in barge transport is achieved only by pooling flows among several 
                                                          
10
In spite of its expensive character, this solution unveils a strategic choice behind this “green logistics.” The 
scarcity of space and the site specificity of Parisian quays led Franprix to be the first to occupy this free space in 
a growing congested context.  
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customers.Additionally, as barge logistics includes pre- or end haulages by road, the 
organizer must provide door-to-door transportation solutions to lower shipper's transaction 
costs. Yet,ex ante transaction costs are still high in river logistics. For example, the delay 
proposed by RSC to position a container in the warehouse of a client is almost twice longer 
for a barge-truck transport (four days) than for an all-truck transport (two days), with the 
same transit times (two days for Paris-Le Havre). This delay increases the ex ante transaction 
costs of a barge-truck trip compared to an all-truck trip for a shipper (Lendjel, 2013). 
Unfamiliar with barge logistics and its transaction costs, the shipper turns more readily to 
road haulage, which has the advantage of ease and flexibility, despite its high cost.The 
development of urban logistics by barge therefore requires a significant reduction in its 
transaction costs. 
2. Second, the barge-truck system implemented by Norbert Dentressangle for Franprixreveals 
the sitespecificity of river ports in major cities. Indeed, the scarcity of available space on the 
docks, combined with increasing traffic jams (and thus the prospect of the inexorable rise of 
environmental taxation), justifyFranprix’s strategic choice to take in advance a strategic 
position in the heart of Paris through long-term contracts with Port de Paris and Paris 
Terminal. The increase of river logistics can’t but raise urban docks' degree of sitespecificity. 
Several ways are possible to reduce this specificity. One of them comes from the fact that, in 
urban areas, the relevant unit of loading is often the pallet or the mini-container rather than 
the container. At that level,one must look for economies of scale necessary for urban river 
logistics. This observation has led the Dutch to innovate – unsuccessfully – with Distrivaart, a 
barge that carries palletized goods between distribution centers and supermarkets 
(Wiegmans, 2005). In terms oftransactional analysis, Distrivaart internalized theservices 
usually providedin the warehouse, namely,managementof pallets andloading and 
unloadingof vehicles. Italso had theadvantage of eliminatingstevedoring usually made by a 
terminal operator and thento reduce thedegree of site specificityof 
riverdocks.Developingurbanriverlogisticsinvolves rethinkingthe scopeand attributes ofSTs 
included in thistransaction. 
3. Third, the scarcity of space in urban dense areas is not conducive to traditional logistics. 
Because of its dimensions, a container cannotbe stored easily in a street on a parking place. 
In addition, loading and unloading a container at the delivery point is a more complex task in 
urban dense areasthan in logistics areas, because a container needs either a quay or to be on 
the floor to be discharged from usual skeleton trailers at shippers’ destination. A special lift-
gate could be added to the rear of the truck, as Norbert Dentressangle did it for its container 
trucks dedicated to Franprix, and, as such, could increase the cost of the solution. Finally, 
loading and unloading a truck is a space- and time-consuming process that has to be 
optimized, particularly inside the city because of the externalities it generates.  
The Distri-Seine/CFT Case 
 
In Norbert Dentressangle’ssolution, reachstackers are used to load and unload containers into and 
from a boat calling at the quay of La Bourdonnais. Handling equipment of ST5 isless specific now, 
with a lower degree of physical asset specificity and a quay with a lower degree of site specificity. By 
decreasing the level of asset specificity, organizational innovations help to lower transaction costs. 
An interesting aspect here was the fact that the initiative was madeby a shipper, akin to improvingits 
reputation asset by greening its supply chain. The engineering process was achieved by a nonriver 
transport company, a company thatcomes from road transport and is familiar with the characteristics 
of shippers’ needs while supplying cities.  
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Another solution called “Distri-Seine”was launched in April 2014 by a river transport company, the 
CFT. Likewise, this solutionaims to decrease the level of asset specificity of ST4 and ST5 in order to 
lower transaction costs. As a matter of fact, ST4 and ST5 handling equipment is internalized on the 
barge in ST3 – and becomes ST3’s second-level STs – by a RoRo process of loading and unloading 
vehicles with lateral built-in ramps. The boat is equipped with elevator systems combined with 
lateral drawbridges that allowthecharge and discharge of electric middle-size trucks from the boat 
side to the quay and conversely. In addition, the boat supplies electric power to the trucks during 
their trip.  
Figure 1 :CFT’s innovative concept of Distri-Seine 
 
Source: CFT (http://www.cft.fr/5-1-1-26-pix-fr/cft-Actu_Distri_Seine.html) 
The concept is not implemented yet, but, according to FerencSzilàgyi,11trucks could be loadedon the 
boat early in the morning near the Rungis International Market, the main food market place of the 
region Ile-de-France, or at the port of Gennevilliers, the main container terminal of the region. A 
couple of hours later, around 9am, thebarge would arrive ata Parisdock, wheredriverswould be 
expectedto recovertheir vehicle andmaketheir distributiontour.Meanwhile,theboat would move to 
another quay in Paris to unload other trucks and wait for the return of the empty trucks or restart to 
Rungisto retrieveanother batchof trucks. No idletime is lost on theboat for the truckdrivers because 
they are transported by bus to the quay.  
 Because of the high level of specificity of physical assets (barge, electric trucks) and the level 
of coordination of their flows, the governance is necessarily integrated or quasi-integrated. From the 
shipper’s point of view, this solution lowers itsex antetransaction costs because this ready-to-use 
solution is a door-to-door service (lastmiles included) provided by one integrated company instead of 
many subcontractors. It also helps to lower ex posttransaction costs with an improved reliability of a 
congestion-free transport chain. From the carrier’s point of view, this solution diminishes the level of 
asset specificity involved in ST4 and ST5. The level of site specificity of quays is considerably lowered 
                                                          
11
Interview withFerencSzilàgyi, market leaderat the CFT (April 22, 2014). 
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because no fixed handling equipment is needed anymore (with the exception of electrical outlets to 
provide power to the barge during its call), contrary to Norbert Dentressangle’s solution. But, in 
losing load capacity and increasing the technical complexity of the system, it increases the level of 
asset specificity of barges in ST3. ST3’s governance structure could switch toward hierarchy instead 
of the hybrid.  
Conclusion 
 Startingwiththe analysis of the existing ways to supply French cities by barge, this article has 
identified several obstacles impeding the use of traditional CBT chains for urban river logistics. The 
analysis of CBT’s STs unveils two main blocking points: the complexity of their chain on the one hand 
and the level of specificity of assets involved in ST4 and ST5 on the other. Several 
innovationsinvolving a barge transport to supply French cities have then been assessed. They share a 
common aim to diminish transaction costs especially in the ST4 and ST5. This is the case with Distri-
Seine, Distrivaart, Norbert Dentressangle/Franprix, SteunpuntGoederenstromen,andVert-chez-vous, 
in which various solutions to despecify the assets and sites involved in those STshave been tried by 
stakeholders. As we can see, innovations in urban river logistics can’t be successful without lowering 
transaction costs. But, of course,production costs are also another major aspect of the equation, 
which have been already stressed elsewhere. The objective of this study was simply to draw 
attention totransaction costs in barge transport, if public authorities wish to encourage its 
development for urban logistics, and to discuss organizational and transactional conditions of 
innovations following this aim.  
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